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STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS APPEAL: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 21 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
Utah Code, Section 78-2-2 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 
Utah Code Ann. §60-30-11 
Utah Code Ann. §60-30-11 (4)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-14 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15 
2 
ARGUMENT: 
There are three steps, with statutory deadlines associated 
with each, for bringing a claim under the Governmental Immunity 
Act. These steps, and the facts in this case related to each, 
are as follows: 
First, the Appellant had one year from April 20, 1993 to 
give written notice of his claim under the Governmental Immunity 
Act (UCA Section 63-30-11; 63-30-12; 63-10-13). Therefore, he 
had until April 20, 1994 to serve written notice. 
Before April 20, 1994, Appellant gave written notice of his 
claim. The first notice was made on August 9, 1993, and the 
second notice on April 19, 1994. Both of these notices were 
within the time permitted by the statutes. 
After the first notice, and before the second notice the 
Appellant changed counsel. The new attorney could not determine 
from the file that the notice had been served. Even if it had 
been served, not all potential litigants were served. The second 
notice, before the statutory deadline, was served on additional 
governmental entities who were not included within the first 
notice. Among those served was the State of Utah, requiring 
compliance with UCA Section 63-30-12, with notice given to the 
Utah Attorney General. The State of Utah could not be ruled out 
as a potential defendant by Appellant at the time, and therefore, 
the second notice included the State. This required new notice 
to the Attorney General. (See, eg. Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of 
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Transportation, 828 P. 2d 535 (Utah 1992).) Proper notice, 
appropriate to all parties receiving notice, was given in the 
second, timely notice of claim. 
The second step for bringing the claim is a denial of the 
claim by the government. This may be through an actual denial, 
or by a constructive denial if no answer is made within 90 days 
of the written claim. (See, UCA Section 63-30-14.) In this 
case, there was a written denial by some of the notified 
entities, and a constructive denial as to the rest. As a result, 
some parties to whom notice was given were not named in the 
subsequent litigation. The denial was effective as to all 
notified parties as of July 18, 1994. 
Thirdly, a suit must be brought within one year of the 
denial. (See, UCA Section 63-30-15.) Appellant had until July 
18, 1995 to bring his suit. He filed his lawsuit on March 30, 
1995. Therefore, he complied with all applicable statutory 
requirements. 
The Defendant relies upon Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132 
(Utah 1992). This case does not support Defendant, however. The 
case involved medical malpractice, and not the governmental 
immunity act. It is accordingly irrelevant to the decision here. 
In the case of Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981), 
the Supreme Court went to some length to allow a case to proceed 
which had technically failed under the statute of limitations. 
In that case the discovery of the cause did not occur until after 
the statute barred the claim. The court found those 
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circumstances unjust, and allowed the stale claim to proceed to 
its merits. Here, the Defendant is arguing for the judicial 
opposite of the Myers case. The Defendant wants a judicially 
created exception which defeats a claim before the statute of 
limitations runs. 
The case of O'Neal v. Division of Family Servicesf 821 P.2d 
1139 (Utah 1991), cited by Defendant, deals with the issue of 
incompetency under UCA Section 63-30-11 (4)(a), and is not 
relevant here. 
The facts of Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 
1992) are also off point. In that case no notice was given until 
over a year after the accident. Therefore, the claim was barred. 
Here, notice was given within the year, and suit filed within a 
year of the second notice. 
In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 
(Utah 1975), there was no notice given. The claimant attempted 
to substitute a conversation for written notice. Here, written 
notice in full compliance with the statute was given. 
In Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) the notice 
was late, and the plaintiff attempted to assert claims not 
mentioned in the notice. Here, the notice was timely, and 
Appellant is pursuing the same claim as contained in the notice. 
Without citing any authority for the proposition, the 
Defendant is attempting to introduce a new requirement into the 
statute. The court is being asked to rule that a notice cannot 
be amended within the time permitted by the statute. You are 
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being asked to add to the statute a provision that if any notice 
is given, such notice is final, unamendable, and forever fixed. 
If an amendment is needed to add parties, or claims, or both, or 
to address additional theories, you are being asked to bar any 
such amendment. The holding in Yearsley, supra, held that claims 
not raised in the notice could not be added by amendment of the 
pleadings before the court. It did not state that claims omitted 
in a first notice could not be added in a second notice given 
within the time permitted by the statute. In fact, the case 
assumes that if the notice had been amended during the 
statutorily permitted period, the claim would have been 
permitted. 
The statute has erected a number of requirements to be met 
before a claim is permitted. The statute is reasonably specific 
in its requirements. It was not adopted to eliminate claims 
against the State or its subdivisions. It was adopted to provide 
an orderly process for advancing such claims. Additional 
hurdles, requirements and barriers should not be added by the 
court to what already has been prescribed by the legislature. 
Nor should the statute be extended to its most restrictive 
extreme. 
The Defendant never replied to either notice of the 
Appellant. If the Defendant believed the second notice was 
superfluous, and that the original notice was the point from 
which all rights would reckon, it would have been simple to tell 
the Appellant that. Instead, the Defendant said nothing. Then, 
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for the first time after the time had expired, the Defendant 
advanced its novel theory of "one notice only" in its motion to 
the court below. 
As stated in Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 
1994), the primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to 
afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to 
pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a 
claim. Plaintiff has satisfied this purpose. Since Plaintiffs 
second claim was legally sufficient and was filed within one year 
of Plaintiffs injury, that notice of claim satisfies the 
jurisdictional requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
The time limits for subsequent actions by Plaintiff must begin to 
run from second claim. Plaintiff has met all relevant time 
limits set forth by law. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court should be reversed. The additional notice 
given was needed, under the circumstances. Therefore, time runs 
from the date of the second notice. 
. A 
DATED this '. \ day of February, 1996. 
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5 SUPREME COURT 78-2-2 
CHAPTER 2 
SUPREME COURT 
Section 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees 
ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3) (a) through (d). 
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(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3) (b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 7S-2-2, enacted bv L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1887, ch. 161, § 303; 1988, 
ch. 248, § 5; 1989, ch. 67, § 1; 1892, ch. 127, 
§ 11; 1994, ch. 191, § 2; 1995, ch. 267, § 5; 
1995, ch. 299, § 46. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27,1992, in Subsection (4), 
deleted former Subsections (e) and (f), which 
read: "general water adjudication" and "taxa-
tion and revenue; and," respectively, making 
related changes; redesignated former Subsec-
tion (g) as Subsection (e); and made stylistic 
changes in Subsection (e). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
added Subsections (3)(k) and (4)(e), making 
related changes. 
The 1995 amendments by ch. 267 and ch. 
299, both effective May 1,1995, made the same 
changes: they changed "Board of State Lands 
and Forestry" to "School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Board of Trustees" in Subsection 
(3)(e)(iii) and added Subsection (3)(eXvi). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appellate juris diction. 
—Attachment. 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Certiorari. 
Original jurisdiction. 
—Extraordinary writs. 
Cited. 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
—Attachment. 
Although this section did not govern a land 
conveyance because it was not in effect when 
petitioner filed its writ of review, this section 
did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdic-
tion, because jurisdiction attached under the 
statute in effect when the petition for review 
was filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n 
v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 
1993). 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Subdivision (3)(e)(ni) confers jurisdiction in 
the Supreme Court only over final orders and 
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative 
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992). 
Certiorari. 
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
granted by this section, the Supreme Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the 
parties should address the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. 
Butterneid v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
Original jurisdiction. 
—Extra ordinary writs. 
The term "onginar in Subsection (2) adds 
nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdic-
tion — and its absence in § 78-2a-3(l) takes 
nothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals — because jurisdiction over petitions 
for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a 
court's jurisdiction to consider a petition origi-
nally filed with it as opposed to its appellate 
jurisdiction over cases that originated else-
where. Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1991). 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
7S-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
Rule 21 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60 
Compiler ' s Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 20, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. • 
rized, U.R.C.P. 42(b). 
• Separate trial autho-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Insurer. 
—Declaratory action as to effect of policy. 
—Personal injur} action. 
Cited. 
Insu re r . 
—Declara tory action as to effect of policy. 
One who claims to be damaged by the negli-
gent act of anoiher is not a proper pari) to an 
action by the insurer of the latter under a pub-
lic liability policy, whereby ? decicrctcry judg-
ment is sought declaring the legal effect of the 
terms of such policy. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. 
Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 
(1957). 
—Personal injury action. 
Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insur-
ance company as a party defendant in a per-
sonal injury action, ba^ed on insurance policy 
providing that the insurance company "has 
agreed to pay a claim only after another claim 
has been prosecuted to a conclusion," did not 
come within the joinder provision of either 
Rule IS b) or this rule. Young v. Barney, 20 
Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 8*6 U9G7). 
Cited in Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404 
P.2d 964 (1965); Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 
646 P.2d 737 (Utah 19S2). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59 Am Jur 2d Parties i> 92 
et sea ; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial £ 12. 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J S Parties ^ 33 to 35, SS 
C.J.S. Trial ** 7 to 10. 
Key Numbers . -
27; Trial c=» 3, 4. 
Parties c= 13 to 16, 24 to 
Rule 21. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. 
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be 
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own 
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim 
against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately. 
This rule i«* identical Compiler 's Note*. 
to Rule Hi. r.JiCV 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Added parties. 
—Sen ice of process. 
—Sole owner of dissolved corporation. 
Severance. 
Added pa r t ies . 
—Service of p roee rs . 
Even though sons were necessary parties 
and in court during the trial, the court could 
not make the sons parties defendant without 
service of summons or other process. Monroe 
Citv v. Arnold, 22 Utah 2d 291, 452 P.2d 321 
(1969). 
—Sole owner of dissolved corporation. 
Trial court had discretion to allow individual 
who was sole owner of corporate stock and 
grantee of land in question to join as plaintiff 
in action brought by corporation to quiet tax 
title to land where corporation had been dis-
solved prior to suit. Falconaero Enter., Inc. v. 
Bowers, 1C Utah 2d 202, 398 P.2d 206 (1965). 
Severance . 
Severance is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court and, absent abuse of such discre-
tion, will not be upset on appeal. King v. Bar-
ron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 
§^ 259 to 278 
59 Am Jur . 2d Parties C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties § 139 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Parties <e=» 77 to 92. 
Rule 22. Interpleader. 
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and 
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may 
be exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objecting to the 
joinder that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their 
claims depend do not have a common origin or are not identical but are 
adverse to and independent of cne another, cr that the plaintiff avers that he 
is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant 
exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of cross-
claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement and do not in 
any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20. 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 63-30-13 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted 
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch. 
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment near the end of the section substituted 
"Section 63-30-11" for "Subsection 63-30-11(4)" 
and added "regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental." 
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
this section, § 63-30-5. 
Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
sions, § 63-37-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Administrative proceedings. 
Claims barred. 
Claims by minors. 
Claims for death. 
Contract action. 
Estoppel. 
Full compliance required. 
Necessity for presentation of claim 
Notice. 
Cited. 
Administrative proceedings. 
Tenured teacher seeking reinstatement fol-
lowing decision to terminate his services had 
no claim for breach of contract until after ad-
verse result at administrative hearing pro-
vided for by the school termination provisions 
(now § 53A-8-101 et seq.); therefore, where he 
filed his notice of claim within the statutory 
period after termination of the hearing, he 
complied with the requirements of this section. 
Pratt v. Board of Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 
1977) (decided under former law). 
Claims barred. 
Neither actual knowledge by county officials 
of circumstances which resulted in death of 
four-year-old child's mother in an automobile 
accident nor minority of the child dispensed 
with necessity of filing timely claim in action 
against county in which it was alleged that 
death was due to inadequate warning signs 
and an improperly constructed guardrail; 
timely claim against county was necessary 
even though county highway department em-
ployee allegedly advised child's attorney, incor-
rectly, that highway in question was main-
tained by state, resulting in initial filing of 
claim against state. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 
158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973). 
Trial court properly dismissed complaint 
against county where notice of the claim was 
not filed with the county commission during 
the year following plaintiffs discovery of her 
injuries. Yates v Vernal Family Health Cen-
ter, 617 P ?d 352 (Utah 1980). 
Claims by minors. 
Failure of a minor to give notice within the 
time pro\ided m this section does not bar the 
minor's claim as the time for notice is tolled 
during minontv bv § 78-12-36. Scott v School 
Bd 568 P 2d 7-16 (Utah 1977). 
Claims for death. 
In ca»es Involving claims for death, the stat-
utory period would commence to run on the 
date of death of the person injured, inasmuch 
as that is the date upon which the damage ac-
crues to the personal representative or third 
party entitled to recover for such wrongful 
death. Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356, 
135 P.2d 259 (1943) (decided under former 
law). 
Contract action. 
An action on a contractual obligation is a 
claim permitted under this chapter, and notice 
of such claim must be filed in accordance with 
this section. Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 
291, 495 P.2d 814 (1972). 
Estoppel. 
County was not estopped from pleading the 
filing deadline of the statutory period as a bar 
to the claim of a boy who had been injured at 
school while playing with dangling wires, even 
though the principal of the school erroneously 
537 
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informed the mother that public service com-
pany was responsible for the wires, and she did 
not discover until after the filing deadline that 
the county tree-trimming employees were in 
fact responsible. Scarborough v. Granite School 
Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) (decided under 
former law). 
Full compliance required. 
Before suit against a political subdivision 
can be allowed, plaintiff must have fully com-
plied with the statutory requirements; and 
thus, prior to filing suit, a claim must be filed 
which (1) is in writing, (2) states the facts and 
the nature of the claim, (3) is signed by the 
claimant, (4) is directed and delivered to some-
one authorized to receive it, and (5) has been 
filed within the prescribed time. Scarborough 
v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1975). 
Necessity for presentation of claim. 
Plaintiff had no cause of action for damages 
to his crops caused by seepage of water from 
defendant city's canal where no claim was pre-
sented therefor to city within a year Dahl v 
Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 (1915) 
(decided under former law). 
Presentation of claim within time fixed by 
law is a condition precedent to bringing action 
against municipality Brown v. Salt Lake City 
33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570, 14 L.R.A. (n.s.) 619* 
126 Am. St R. 828, 14 Ann. Cas. 1004 (1908); 
Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 
P. 213 (1924) (decided under former law). 
Notice. 
The fact that employees of the county in fact 
knew of the plaintiffs injuries at the time they 
occurred does not dispense with the necessity 
of filing a timely claim. Edwards v. Iron 
County ex rel. Valley View Medical Center 
531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975). 
Notice provision in this section is applicable 
to § 63-30-9 Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 
P.2d 1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former 
law). 
Cited in Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 
(Utah 1985); Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1988) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 56 Am Jur 2d Municipal 
Corporations, Count.es and Other Political 
Subdmsions § 680 ct seq 
C.J.S. — 20 C J S Counties §§ 297, 298, 
323,64CJS Mun:c.n*l Corporations ^ 2173, 
2174, 2199, 79 C J 5 Schools and School Dis-
tricts §§ 423, 433 
A.L.R. — See A L R Annotations set forth 
under * 63-30-11 
Key Numbers. — Counties <$=> 200, 203, 213; 
Municipal Corporations @=> 1001, 1005, 1008, 
1021, Schools and School Districts <$=> 112, 115. 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by gov-
ernmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
Within ninet}' days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its 
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its 
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end 
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filing action against governmental entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has 
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expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 15; 1933, ch. 
129, * 6; 1985, ch. 82, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 7. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1985 amend-
ment substituted "or an employee of the en-
tity" for "in those circumstances in which im-
munity from suit has been waived in this chap-
ter" at the end of the first bentence 
Amended complaint 
Estoppel 
Extension of time for filing suit 
Waiver for contractual obligations 
A m e n d e d compla in t . 
Plaintiffs complied with this section where, 
within a year after the cause of action arose, 
thev filed notice of claim with the attorney 
general and the agency concerned on the same 
day they filed the original complaint with the 
court, and amended complaint alleging compli-
ance 'vith the Go \ i i nme n t a l Immunity Act 
\v io tiled, as a nattei of rignt within one >ear 
after denial of th j c l a ' n or aitv.r the end of the 
90-da\ penod m wmJa the claua is detmed to 
have been denied Johnson v Utah State Re-
tirement Office, 621 P 2 d 1234 (Utah 1980) 
Es toppe l . 
Whether city was estopped to asseit statute 
of limitationi m ^uit for injuries sustained by 
chi«d m cave-m at a t ; -owned clay bank adja-
cent to municipally maintained park was a 
quebt'on of fact, entiy or no cauze of action 
judgment waa precluded v\ht»re evidence pie-
sented dispute as to whether plaintiffs' attor-
ney had been "lulled" into not filing suit by 
assurances there »vould be a oettlement within 
insurance policy limits Whicaker v Salt Lake 
City Corp, 522 P 2d 1252 (Utah 1974) 
His tory : L. 1065, ch. 139, § 18; 1933, ch. 
129, § 7. 
The 1987 amendment added the designa-
tions to the previously undesignated section, m 
Subsection (2), added at the end "regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the 
claim is characterized as governmental", and 
made minor changes in phraseology 
Governmental entity vvas not estopped from 
asserting the statute of limitations on 'he basis 
that an adjustor of its insurance carrier 
"lulled" plaintiff into delay where plamtuf vvao 
at all times represented by an attorney 
Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P 2d 925 (Utah 1977/. 
Extens ion of t ime for filing suit. 
Where plaintiff sustained injur ia fi^m al-
leged fail from negligently maintained 
bleachers on school grounds and evidence indi-
cated that delay in filing claim wa^ cauoed by 
misiepresentations of school's insurance aj^nt, 
trial couit erred in Iismi-sirg comnlaint vith 
prejudice on gioundo that ^ratuie of iiraitationb 
barr td such claim Rice v Giamte School Dist , 
23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P 2d 159 (1969), distin-
guished, Scarborough v Granite School Dis t , 
531 P 2 d 4S0 (Utah 1975) 
Waiver for con t r ac tua l obligat ions. 
Whore a sanitarv district sc" cr li^e became 
clogged, resulting in damages to houses owned 
by a private citizen, a subsequent action 
against the sewer district was not subject to 
the one-vear limitations penod for actions 
against the government insofar as it was based 
on breach of contract Dal ton v Salt Lake Sub 
Son Dist , 676 P 2d 399 (Utah 1984) 
83-C0-13. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions — Ap-
plication of Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any action 
brought under this chapter, and such actions shall be governed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in so far as they are consistent with this chapter. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS milled in his official capacity since this section 
is not in conflict with Utah Const., Art. VII, 
District court jurisdiction
 g e c 1 3 H u l b e r t v S l a t e > 6 0 7 R 2 d 1217 (Utah 
Sovereign immunity in federal courts. 1980) 
District court jurisdiction. _ . .A . . , _ 
The district court had exclusive, original ju- Sovereign immunity in federal courts. 
risdiction of an action by the former chairman T h l s a c t l a c k s t h e c l e a r l n t e n t necessary 
and director of the state liquor control commis- u n d e r Eleventh Amendment to U.S. Constitu-
sion for attorneys' fees incurred in the success- t l 0 n t o waive state's immunity from suit in fed-
ful defense of twelve indictments issued eral court. Harris v. Tooele County School 
against him for alleged acts or omissions com- Dist, 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973). 
63-30-17. Venue of actions. 
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the claim 
arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against a county may be brought in the 
county in which the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon leave 
granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county con-
tiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex parte. Actions 
against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, shall be 
brought in the county in which the political subdivision is located or in the 
county in which the claim arose. 
History: L. 19C5, ch. 139, fc 17; 1983, ch. 
129, * 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Federal court actions. Amendment to U S Constitution. Harris v. 
This section indicates Utah does not intend Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th 
to waive sovereign immunity under Eleventh Cir. 1973). 
63-30-1S. Compromise and settlement of actions. 
A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal officer or other legal 
counsel if it has no such officer, may compromise and settle any action as to 
the damages or other relief sought. 
The risk manager in the Department of Administrative Services may com-
promise and settle any claim for damages filed against the state up to and 
including $10,000 for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable, and 
may, with the concurrence of the attorney general or his representative and 
the executive director of the Department of Administrative Services, compro-
mise and settle a claim for damages in excess of $10,000 for which the Risk 
Management Fund may be liable. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 18; 1981, ch. not admissible to prove liability for injury, 
250, § 6; 1983, ch. 303, § 2; 1983, ch. 320, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409. 
§ 54. Rescission of release or settlement by injured 
Cross-References. — Governmental Immu- person, §§ 78-27-32 to 78-27-36. 
nity Act provisions not construed as admission R ^
 m a n ager in Department of Administra-
or denial of liability, § 63-30-4.
 t i v e Services, § 63-1-45 et seq. 
Payment of medical and similar expenses 
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